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This paper analyzes the contextual influences on trilateral 
cooperation between the governments of China, Japan, and 
Republic of Korea in global economic governance. The Trilateral 
Summit was initiated over a decade ago, with the intention of 
augmenting their cooperation.The recent revival of the summit 
process could be a platform for enhancing mutual cooperation in 
global, as well as regional, economic governance. The following 
examines how social, ideational, authority, and contextual factors 
influence trilateral relations.This constitutes a constructivist 
analytical approach, emphasizing effects of international 
practices, relations, and authority shifts, especially since the 
2008 global financial crisis,while positing the significance of 
contextual rationality. The analysis focuses on the consequences of 
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cooperation and policy convergence on sustainable development 
norms and practices, plus on aspects of multilateral trade 
and financial regulation. This indicates the significance of 
international socialization and contextual rationality for trilateral 
cooperation.
　The third Trilateral Summit between leaders of China, Japan, 
and Republic of Korea (ROK) was held in Jeju, Korea, in May 
2010. The prospects for trilateral cooperation in global economic 
governance, therefore, seems a fitting topic for this peace forum in 
Jeju. The following emphasizes how the shifting international context 
influences cooperation, particularly theeffects of international 
agency, relations, practices, and authority.  
　Closer trilateral cooperation in global economic governance 
could be achievable, though there are challenges and obstacles to 
overcome. The first section of the paper indicates the analytical 
approach, which combines insights from social constructivism 
with a focus onpractices, relations, shifting authority, and contextual 
rationality. The second examines the recent history of trilateral 
summits and cooperation. The third analyzes regional economic 
and development cooperation between the three states. The fourth 
gauges the significance of convergence between Chinese, Japanese, 
and Korean perspectives on sustainable economic development. 
The fifth section assesses trilateral approaches to global economic 
governance, and the potential for greater cooperation, including at 
the Group of Twenty (G20).
　The 2018 Trilateral Summit leaders’ declaration noted several 
shared priorities, in diverse aspects of global and regional economic 
governance. Trilateral cooperation in global economic governance 
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could enhance mutual policy goals, but also diplomatic relations. 
The present study analyzes how the international ideational context, 
practices, and relations influence prospects for the three states 
to achieve global, in addition to regional, economic governance 
cooperation. 
Analytical approach
International Relations (IR) scholarship often focuses on states 
as rational actors in an anarchic international system. This paper 
contests the assumption that the rationality of individuals, states, 
or other ‘units’should be considered unproblematical, even when 
accounting for imperfect information. The following posits the notion 
of contextual rationality for understanding the social embeddedness of 
agency, especially indicating how shifting global governance and 
diplomatic practices influence international relations. 
　The increasing focus on ‘practices’ in IR research, building 
on studies from social theorists such as Etienne Wenger (1998), 
provides useful insights into often ignored ‘background’ issues. 
Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot (2011, 5) have defined practices 
as “patterned actions that are embedded in particular organized 
contexts and, as such, are articulated into specific types of action 
and are socially developed through learning and training.” Shared 
practices are crucial to international relations; as Ted Hopf (1998, 179) 
notes, “Social practices,to theextentthatthey authorize, discipline,and 
police, have the power to reproduce entirecommunities, including the 
international community, as well as the many communities of identity 
found therein.”
　Global and regional economic cooperation between officials and 
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policymakers from China, Japan, and ROK is influenced by norms, 
practices, and relational processes. These contribute to perceived 
mutual interests and potential ‘win―win’ cooperation, especially 
through forms of socialization, indicating how actors are influenced 
to adopt certain international norms and practices. The constitutive 
effects of social embeddedness on individual rationality do not 
negate the potential for instrumental agency. In this sense, ‘over-
socialization’ is not the alternative to ‘under-socialization’ (see 
Granovetter 1985). A contextual analysis of international practices 
avoids this binary choice between agency and structure, in common 
with recent East Asian scholarship on “relationality” and social 
processes, hence contextualized social relations (Qin 2016).
　Contextual rationality is linked to the notion of bounded 
rationality;but rather than emphasize individual ‘satisficing’ in 
decision-making (see Gigerenzer 2010; Simon 1959; 1972), it stresses the 
social and historical embeddedness, plus context-dependent practices 
and relations, that influence international relations.IR scholars (Nelson 
and Katzenstein 2014) and economic sociologists (Fourcade 2006; 
Mackenzie and Millo 2003) have researched how social conventions 
and practices, rather than purely rational calculation, account for 
important aspects of the behavior of financial-market actors (see 
Luckhurst 2017, 86-87). This is the same for international actors, 
including in the context of trilateral cooperation. 
　International actors knowingly or unknowingly make choices that 
are influenced by socially- and historically-constructed discourses 
or narratives, sometimes in the form of background knowledge 
(Adler 2008; 2019), what some would call ‘ideology.’However, 
actorsalsomodify international relations and policy practices in the 
process of reproducing them, through often-reciprocal forms of 
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international socialization (see Keck and Sikkink 1999, 99-100; Pu 2012; 
Terhalle 2011). Amitav Acharya (2014) and Antje Wiener (2004) note, in 
particular, that international norms might be adapted and ‘localized’ 
in the process of implementation. 
　Contextual aspects of rationality are evident in analyzing the 
influence of the G20 and other global or regional governance fora 
(see Luckhurst 2016). Another key aspect here is the analysis of 
international authority, and how it is constituted, and sometimes 
contested, through international relations. The present study applies 
this analytical framework to the case of trilateral cooperation in 
global and regional economic governance. 
Trilateral summits and cooperation
The Trilateral Summit framework was established just over a decade 
ago. The initial Trilateral Summit in December 2008, in Fukuoka, 
Japan, was intended to enhance relations between China, Japan, 
and ROK. This relationship was formalized in 2011, when the three 
states established, through a formal treaty, the Trilateral Cooperation 
Secretariat (TCS) headquartered in Seoul. 
　The Trilateral Summit was held annually from 2008-12, but only 
twice since, in 2015 and 2018 in Tokyo. The fact that another Trilateral 
Summit is scheduled for 2019, this time in Beijing, indicates the 
process is currently being revived as a feature of China―Japan―
ROK relations.Trilateral ministerial meetings continued, despite the 
decreased summit frequency, however there have been obstacles to 
cooperation.The deterioration in diplomatic ties was a key factorin 
the irregularity of summits since 2012. The TCS remained, however, as 
a rather unusual international organization, effectively a secretariat 
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without the other organizational bodies or committees commonly 
associated with international institutions.It is also notable that the 
TCS is“unique as the only existing inter-governmental organization 
in Northeast Asia” (Zhang 2018, 250), though with just a small staff and 
budget. The Trilateral Foreign Ministers’ Meeting is meant to provide 
certain executive functions, so the absence of these meetings in some 
yearshas undermined the work of the TCS (Zhang 2018, 258).
　This brief introduction to the history of the Trilateral Summit 
and the TCS indicates the scope for it to become amore significant 
framework for cooperation between the three states. The most recent 
Trilateral Summit leaders’ declarationalso reiterated their mutual 
support for other forms of multilateralism, including the core role for 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in underpinning international 
trade,plus the global governance role of the G20. They further 
endorsed closer regional cooperation, through the ASEAN Plus Three 
group, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, and by other means 
(TCS 2018). The document alsonoted their cooperation on sustainable 
development, a key policy area with substantial scope for trilateral 
cooperation through global and regional governance fora.
　The 2018 leaders’ declaration notes the “three countries share 
everlasting history and infinite future” (TCS 2018), indicating mutual 
recognition of their interdependence. This is not to deny the 
existence of political differences, for example the current dispute 
between the Japanese and Korean governments over the latter’s ban 
on seafood from Fukushima since the 2011 nuclear disaster (Hosokawa 
2019). Their proximity has shaped strategic suspicions and historical 
disputes, contextual factors not easily mitigated by individual rational 
calculation. Afocus on contextual rationality, relationality, and 
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reciprocal processes of socialization indicates prospects for trilateral 
cooperation, despite diplomatic and political differences. 
Trilateral regional economic and development cooperation
This section assesses key issues for trilateral regional economicand 
development cooperation. Global and Asian multilateral relations 
on economic and development governance influence the contextual 
rationality of regional and global policy actors, including those from 
China, Japan, and ROK. 
　Recent global authority shifts, especially since the 2008-2009 
global financial crisis (GFC), increased the relative global and 
Asian economic influence of officials and policymakers from China 
and ROK, andarguably even Japan. The Trump Administration’s 
rejection of the Trans-Pacific Partnership left the Japanese 
in the lead diplomatic role, plus the largest economy of what 
subsequently became the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-
Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The broader retrenchment of American 
relations with East Asia (see Lin 2016; Liow 2017; Smith 2017; Tan and 
Hussain 2017), further indicated the increased regional economic 
influenceof the Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese. RCEP exemplifies 
this regional multilateral engagement from the three states, with all 
three members. It indicates abasic normative convergence on trade 
multilateralism, despite some differences on the content of trade 
agreements, with the Chinese preferring to exclude from RCEP some 
of the regulatory issues included in CPTPP, such as stricter labor and 
environmental provisions.  
　Cooperation between the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and 
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is interesting, due 
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to the apparent divergence in strategic priorities of their main state 
sponsors: the Japanese and Americans at the ADB; and the Chinese 
at the AIIB. ROK also is akey member of both institutions. It is 
arguably surprising that formal cooperation was initiated, through 
the banks’ 2016 memorandum of understanding (ADB and AIIB 2016), 
perhapseven more that mutual technical and strategic cooperation 
already exists, with jointly-financed projects in Bangladesh, Georgia, 
India, and Pakistan (ADB 2017). The strategic, political, and cognitive 
effects of the GFC crucially influenced their cooperation, partly by 
increasing the relative authority of Chinese policy actors in Asia, 
especially on economic development issues. The ‘cognitive’ and 
political authority of the Koreans on development governance was 
similarly boosted. In the present study, strategic authority refers to the 
significance ofdurable strategic resources and capacities foractors’ 
perceived authoritativeness. Political authority concerns actors’ 
perceived or socially-constructed “political rights and responsibilities” 
(Ruggie 1982, 380). The notion of cognitive authority indicates actors’ 
perceived authoritativeness, due to their professional role and 
intellectual or ideational status markers (Broome and Seabrooke 2015; 
see Luckhurst 2017)
　Lessons from the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, augmented by 
those from the GFC, undermined earlier conventional wisdom 
in development policymaking (see Widmaier et al. 2007). This 
undermining of recent ‘western’ governance norms and practices 
reduced the cognitive authority, especially, of officials from the 
Group of Seven (G7) states and Bretton Woods institutions (Luckhurst 
2017). Many policymakers from leading developing states, such as 
Brazil, China, and India, became more skeptical of policy advice 
from western-dominated institutions, for example due to the widely-
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perceived failures of the 1990s Washington Consensus and, in 
particular, the IMF’s role in exacerbating several financial crises 
through its structural-adjustment programs (Broad 2004, 133-134; 
Cooper 2008, 254; Easterly 2003; Luckhurst 2017, 156-163; Rodrik 2012, 
90-95; Sohn 2005, 490-492; Stiglitz 2003, 245-246; 2004).
　Japanese economic policymakers had been more skeptical about 
the Washington Consensus than their G7 counterparts. Partly for 
this reason, after 2008 they quickly joined other Asian regional 
policymakers in adapting their policy discourse to fit the growing 
sustainable development consensus. The latter indicated new policy 
practices but also provided common grounds, as well asrhetorical 
tools, through which Chinese and Japanese officials, at the AIIB 
and ADB respectively, could legitimize inter-bank cooperation as an 
Asian partnership for regional development cooperation (ADB 2016). 
These multilateral development banks (MDBs) stress their shared 
approaches to regional development cooperation, including their 
assessment of the need to increase regional multilateral financial 
resources (ADB 2017; AIIB 2016, 13). Regular meetings between ADB 
chief Takehiko Nakao and AIIB head Liqun Jin indicate amutual 
prioritization of inter-institutional cooperation (Cislo and Hays 2017). 
There is persistent media speculation about potential competition 
between the two MDBs, but no clear evidence of it in practice; their 
joint development investment projects underscore the level of actual 
cooperation.
　The Chinese government’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI), an 
ambitious infrastructure investment project, augmented their officials’ 
regional authority. AIIB and BRI are not formally linked, but both 
contribute to the influence of Chinese policy actors on regional 
development governance. Another key factor was the BRICS’ New 
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Development Bank (NDB), which provided a template for how an 
MDB could support ‘South―South’ cooperation, both for Chinese 
officials and potential AIIB partners and clients. The American and 
Japanese roles in Asian economic and development governance have 
also undergone significant adjustments. The Trump Administration’
s voluntary relinquishing of American leadership in the Asia-Pacific, 
or ‘Indo-Pacific,’ left the Japanese as the main alternative to Chinese 
regional economic influence, despite having fewer financial resources 
available for large-scale investment projects. Japanese leadership 
at the ADB indicates their key regional development role, because 
the ADB remains the most important regional source of multilateral 
development financing (O’Keeffe et al. 2017, 13). 
　Partnership between these Chinese- and Japanese- led MDBs 
augments their regional economic influence. ADB―AIIB cooperation 
provides a mediated form of inter-state collaboration, rather than 
an explicitly bilateral one. This could hold instrumental political 
advantagesfrom depoliticization through inter-institutional ties, 
potentially reducing political contestation and negative public 
reactions to cooperation between states often perceived as strategic 
competitors. Recent discussion of the potential for Japan to 
become involved in jointly-financing BRI projects with the Chinese, 
particularly from the Chinese side (Japan Today [Associated Press] 2019), 
indicates a broader reconsideration of the benefits of bilateral 
cooperation on regional development projects. Trilateral cooperation 
on development financing, trade, and other economic issuesis equally 
tied to such contextual rationality shifts, and could be facilitated by 
the veneer of depoliticization linked to technocratic approaches to 
international cooperation (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 708-709).
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Trilateral cooperation and the sustainable development consensus 
The financial crises of the 1990s and early-2000s undermined the 
strategic, political, and cognitive authority of the Bretton Woods 
institutions, and their western backers, on global development 
issues. The professional competence of western policymakers who 
had endorsed the Washington Consensus prescriptions was widely 
questioned. The GFC further diminished their cognitive authority, as 
the ‘New Classical’ intellectual foundations of policy advice from 
the Bretton Woods institutions and G7 officials ― underpinned bythe 
market-efficiency hypothesis and liberalization and deregulation 
policies ― were undermined by the crisis spreading from western 
financial centers, especially New York and London.
　The 1990s Asian financial crisisdamaged the political and strategic 
authority of western-led institutions and governments. This was 
indicated by the strategic economic policy shift away from attracting 
inward foreign investment, in states such as China, Indonesia, Japan, 
Malaysia, ROK, Singapore, and Thailand, a policy endorsed by the 
Bretton Woods institutions in the early 1990s; to prioritizing, instead, 
export-led growthand sovereign capital accumulation. Aside from this 
rejection of the Washington approach, the regional loss of confidence 
in the IMF was underlined by its lack of borrowers, hence the risk of 
insolvency due to declining interest payments by 2007 (Woods 2010, 
52-53). This loss of confidence was also evident in Latin America, 
where Argentinian, Brazilian, Colombian, and Mexican policymakers 
similarly avoided borrowing from the IMF, due to their skepticism 
about the institution and its policy advice and lending practices (Arditi 
2008, 71; Grugel and Riggirozzi 2012, 4-5; Ocampo 2009, 715-716).
　The existence of alternative development models was significant 
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for the institutional embeddedness of regional economic strategies. 
Japanese economic growth from the 1960s-1980s provided insights for 
other regional policymakers, including their emphasis on the guiding 
strategic economic role of the state. American influence in Latin 
America had the opposite effectin the 1980s and 1990s, undermining 
confidence in the strategic economic management capacities of the 
state. The Japanese economic development experience influenced the 
Koreans, Chinese, and Singaporeans (Wade 1996), leading to a growth-
oriented, export-led Asian development approach. One important 
aspect of this was a broadly-shared normative understanding of the 
state as a strategic facilitator of markets, including a prioritization of 
what later would be considered ‘sustainable’ development practices, 
on matters such as ‘human-capital’ enhancement through education 
and training, plus an emphasis on infrastructure development (Stiglitz 
1996).  
　Chinese and Korean policymakers gained credibil i ty in 
development policy circles, due to their success in sustaining rapid 
economic growth over recent decades. The Korean G20 Presidency 
of 2010 accomplished G20 support for its ‘Seoul Development 
Consensus’ (G20 2010), whilealso initiating the expansion of the G20’s 
policy agenda beyond its core issues of global economic recovery 
and financial reform (Luckhurst 2016). The growing sustainable 
development consensus helped legitimize Chinese and Korean 
influence in global and regional development governance, especially 
due to the compatibility of their policy priorities with core tenets 
of sustainable development. Infrastructure investment has been a 
key component of each states’ development approaches, a linkage 
that Chinese policymakers indicated by setting up the AIIB and 
BRI. Partly for this common policy focus, the Koreans joined and 
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became core members of the AIIB, even hosting its second annual 
meeting in Jeju, in June 2017 (Lee et al. 2017). Thegrowing role of 
the AIIB was consolidated through a ‘South―South’ discourse of 
mutual cooperation, normatively legitimizing Chinese influence in 
development cooperation as a kind of mutually-supportive ethos of 
interdependence. 
　ADB―AIIB cooperation has been similarly justified on normative 
grounds of regional cooperation, as an alternative to diminishing 
western economic and development leadership. The compatibility of 
the sustainable development approach with Asian policy practices, 
influenced, as noted, by Japanese economic policies in the mid-
twentieth century, reinforced regional support for the sustainable 
development agenda. This echoed Amitav Acharya ’s (1997 ) 
discussion of the normative localization of Asia-Pacific approaches 
to multilateralism, further indicating how the contextual rationality 
of ADB and AIIB policy actors has been influenced by global and 
regional strategic, political, and cognitive authority shifts. The latter 
are tied to broad ideational and discursive shifts, around which 
collaborative ADB―AIIB projects could be articulated and, potentially,
depoliticized.
Potential for trilateral cooperation in global economic governance 
Trilateral cooperation should not be measured, purely, in financial 
terms and by individual project outcomes; it is also important 
to assess global and regional authority effects, partly through 
socialization. ADB―AIIB cooperation has contributed to decentralizing 
strategic, political, and cognitive authority in global and regional 
economic governance since the GFC. It enhances the development 
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governance role of Chinese policy actors, while also potentially 
augmenting Japanese policy actors’ influence, by positioning them in 
a multilateral steering role, in this senseemergingfrom the shadow of 
American global and regional leadership. This could have significant 
consequences for the ADB and Japanese international influence, 
despite fears that declining U.S. engagement in Asia could undermine 
Japanese regional authority.
　The ADB and AIIB both indicate their convergence on contemporary 
norms and practices of global development governance (ADB and 
AIIB 2016). This enhances Chinese global governance authority, 
reaffirming John Ikenberry’s (2008) optimistic prediction that the 
Chinese would become increasingly integrated as ‘stakeholders’ in 
global economic governance. Chinese influence and authority in 
global and regional economic governance, including through the 
AIIB, involves reciprocal socialization (Hanlon 2017, 549; Peng and 
Tok 2016, 742; see Johnston 2008). The AIIB and the BRICS’ NDB, in 
addition to the BRI, became new outlets for Chinese financing and 
enhanced their authoritativeness in global and regional development 
governance. This was partly in response to the slowness of 
institutional reform elsewhere, particularly at the Bretton Woods 
institutions; while the G20 was another new context that augmented 
Chinese influence and integration in global governance.
　The fact that the AIIB now has more members than the ADB 
underlines how successfully Chinese officials reduced skepticism 
and increased their multilateral economic development role. Despite 
American opposition under the Obama Administration, the UK 
government and several other U.S. allies became AIIB members. 
Chinese authorities have carefully distinguished between the AIIB 
role as an independent MDB, and its more clearly government-
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controlled BRI projects. The ADB’s leadership, moreover, was not 
deterred from formal cooperation with the AIIB. 
　ADB―AIIB cooperation increased the funds available for Asian 
infrastructure investment, a crucial aspect of economic development. 
It also contributed to the integration of Chinese officials at the core 
of global and regional development governance, in cooperation 
with Japanese officials. It further integrates Chinese policymakersin 
ideational and cognitive terms, while reinforcing often Asian-
influenced sustainable development norms and practices. This 
indicates the relative shift in authority in global and regional 
governance, with the Chinese, Koreans, and other Asian and 
developing-state policy actors playing a greater role, relative to 
the North Americans and Europeans. Japanese policymakers’ and 
officials’ global influencealso could be augmented through their 
regional authority.
　The G20 is an important multilateral context in which China, Japan, 
and ROK have played significant roles. Each has hosted the rotating 
G20 presidency, indicating their substantial authority in global 
economic governance since the GFC. The three governments share 
some key global policy priorities, including their official commitment 
to multilateral trade norms and rules, and upholding the institutional 
role of the WTO; on sustainable economic development, partly due 
to the influence of Asian development norms and practices; and on 
macroprudential financial regulation, with their mutual preference 
for a more cautious approach to financial-sector governance, 
relative topolicy practices in the UK and U.S., especially until 
2008. Trilateral coordination on key global economic governance 
issues, particularlyat the G20, with advantages from technocratic 
depoliticization similar to ADB―AIIB cooperation, could augment 
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their leverage in multilateral negotiations and amplify their influence 
on the global governance agenda.
　Differences and diplomatic disputes sometimes come to the fore, 
including the aforementioned dispute over Japanese fish exports to 
ROK. Relations between Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and 
Korean President Moon Jae-in have recently deteriorated, especially 
over historical controversies from the Japanese colonial period in 
Korea (Kimura2019). This has led to speculation that, while Abe plans 
to hold a bilateral meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping during 
the Osaka G20 Summit, such a meeting might not be held with Moon 
(Japan Times [Kyodo] 2019). The significant improvement in China―Japan 
relations, by contrast, is indicated by the recent meeting between 
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Japan’s Foreign Minister Taro 
Kono, at which both touted improvements in bilateral ties. There was 
ashared assessment that theirbilateral, regional, and global economic 
cooperation would be mutually beneficial. Concerns and uncertainty 
about the Trump Administration’s international economic policies 
give added impetus for cooperation (Japan Today [Associated Press] 2019). 
Growing Sino―Japanese economic cooperation is indicated across 
a range of issues, including on the importance of the WTO andon 
bilateral infrastructure projects in third countries (Armstrong 2018; 
Mainichi 2018). China―ROK relations are similarly improving, on 
Korean Peninsula security issues and bilateral economic ties (South 
China Morning Post [Associated Press] 2018; Xinhuanet2018).
　The post-GFC context of global economic governance indicates 
shifts in international authority, from the North to the South andfrom 
West to East. This is partly because the GFC constituted what 
historical institutionalists call a ‘critical juncture,’ undermining 
conventional wisdom and further decentralizing international 
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authority (Luckhurst 2017). This new scenario has been influenced by 
the revisionism of the Trump Administration, in terms of its rejection 
of multilateral norms and practices (Luckhurst 2017, 131-143), with 
significant effects on world politics and international relations. This 
indicates the importance of reassessing contextual factors, such as 
socialization, that influence trilateral relations; while identifying areas 
of policy convergence that might deepen cooperation and increase 
shared prosperity, with diplomatic benefits such as enhancing 
regional and global peace and security. 
Conclusion
The gradual improvement in trilateral diplomatic relations through 
global and regional economic cooperation, especially due to shared 
policy practices and more institutionalized as well as informal 
interactions, contributes to depoliticizing mutual cooperation. These 
diplomatic and multilateral practicesenhance trilateral diplomatic, 
political, and economic outcomes, while increasing their global and 
regional governance authority.
　The three governments continue to have disagreements, though 
relations shift over time; currently Japan―ROK relations are at a 
low point, but China―Japan relations are improving, as are China―
ROK ties. Shared policy priorities in global and regional economic 
governance are important for their contextual rationality, despite 
historical and recent disputes. Trilateral cooperation on the global 
governance agenda, at fora such as the G20, increases their leverage, 
influence, and authority in global economic and development 
governance. This constitutes a rational basis for cooperation, but the 
contextuality of their relations also shapes prospects for cooperation.
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　The current revival of the Trilateral Summit could be utilized by the 
three governments to augment their diplomatic influence and global 
authority, particularly to enhance cooperation at the G20 and other 
global and regional fora and institutions. This should further reduce 
diplomatic tensions and help cement social, political, and economic 
ties, which are the foundations for peaceful and harmonious 
relations.
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